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Abstract 
In the recent discussion about the future of modern capitalist societies many well-thought 
speculations rely on the interplay between continued processes of globalization, increased 
trends of so-called digitalization and other forms of technological progress and their effects 
on the system of organizations and occupations. In the sociology of change and political 
conflict, middle classes have always held a central function. Middle classes serve as a kind 
of conflict buffer of modern societies. According to Collins (2013), technological 
displacement of middle-class labour is not much more than twenty years old; while it took 
almost 200 years to destroy the working-class labour force, computerization of middle-class 
labour (since the last decade of the 20th century) is proceeding at a much faster pace than 
the mechanization of the manual labour force (which took approximately the entire 19th 
century and three-quarters of the 20th) (Collins 2013, 56). The topic is closely connected to 
discussion in evolutionary economics as provided by Schumpeters (2000) idea of creative 
destruction which is led by the assumption of a fragile balance between births and deaths 
of firms, jobs, occupations, and economic sectors in the course of economic development. 
Of course, there is already some lively discussion on automation and digitalization as such, 
but less research focusses explicitly at the middle classes.  
The paper tries to test Collins thesis of an increased de-middledization by international 
comparative data provided by Eurostat for the period from 2003 to 2014. Firstly, we examine 
the size of the middle class and the changes within the time period based on the European 
Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) dataset. We find the evidence of 
a negative link between digitalization and the size of the middle class, but the result is 
highly sensitive to the definition of middle class as the dependent variable. As suggested by 
Piketty (2014), the term of middle class is debatable because it does not have any single 
definition. The most consistent effect is shown when we define the middle class as the share 
of households whose incomes are between 60 percent and 150 percent median. 
While there appears to be only limited effect of ICT contribution on GDP and total 
employment on the size of the middle class, the evidence is highly significant in the effect 
of innovation in digital sector as measured by ICT-related patents on the size of the middle 
class. One explanation for this might be ICT-related innovation is benefited not only by those 
in ICT sectors, but also the wide array of occupations. Therefore, approaching digitalization 
indicator by the contribution of ICT sector to the GDP and total employment could be 
misleading. With this paper, we have provided only the first test of the relationship between 
digitalization and the size of the middle class.  
1. Introduction 
The paper is about a socioeconomics and sociology of middle classes in a theoretical 
discussion and empirically focussing at middle class segments of different European 
societies for the time period between 2003 and 2014. The argumentation is strongly 
embedded to Schumpeterian thought of evolutionary economics but it is tried to link 
discussion about creative destruction to digitalization and the evolution of stratified 
societies in Europe on international comparison. The paper attempts to question 
assumptions of growing inequality theoretically and empirically by referring to Collins 
thesis of an increased de-middledization. We argue that the ability of ICT innovations       
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(i.e. digitalization) to perform specialized, routine, and predicted tasks better than human 
allows them to supress middle skilled labor, affect to the polarization of jobs, and finally 
lead to de-middledization. 
2. Schumpeter: Creative Destruction 
Creative Destruction is the famous but ambivalent term, which was originated by Joseph A. 
Schumpeter (1883  1950), an Austrian economist who had professorships in Austria and 
Germany before joining the faculty at Harvard University in the early 1930s where he spent 
the rest of his career. The term refers to the economic processes by which old systems, 
technology, innovation, and thinking is destroyed by new ones. Schumpeter saw creative 
destruction as a logical by product of capitalism, but not necessarily as a good thing. 
From a contemporary perspective, Schumpeter was truly interdisciplinary and his many 
works span fields such as sociology, finance economics, and politics (Bögenhold 2014). Over 
a time span of nearly fifty years, Schumpeter published numerous articles and books. 
Creative Destruction serves as a title of a chapter in the book Capitalism, Socialism, and 
Democracy (2000 [1942]) in which he deals with the modus operandi of competition. 
Schumpeter argues against some predominant economic thought at his time, which was 
characterized as being static. In opposition to that, Schumpeter conceptualized economy 
being in a constant flux of economic and social change. Schumpeter frequently discussed 
the parallels and divergences of his thought and Marxism:  The essential point to grasp is 
that in dealing with capitalism we are dealing with an evolutionary process. It may seem 
strange that anyone can fail to see so obvious a fact which moreover was long ago 
emphasized by Karl Marx (Schumpeter 2000, p. 82). 
Schumpeter is regarded as one of the pioneers of evolutionary economics. He viewed 
capitalism as a form or method of economic change (Schumpeter 2000, p. 82). Creative 
destruction is a contradictory expression, which seeks to highlight the fact that competition 
and inherent processes towards monopolistic and oligopolistic competition are only one part 
of the overall economic game. Too often neglected are simultaneous processes of the 
creation of new firms, new ideas, and even new business leaders elsewhere in an economy. 
Deaths and births both of business enterprises and individuals are two sides of the same 
coin, and Schumpeter dubbed creative destruction as an essential fact about capitalism.  
Creative destruction has to be seen in a wider context of innovation and entrepreneurship 
for which Schumpeter is well-known. Entrepreneurs are treated as agents to introduce new 
inputs into the economy. He defined an entrepreneur as a person who comes up with new 
combinations (new goods, new methods of production, new markets, new sources of 
supply, new organizations of any industry or combinations between these items) which are 
commonly called innovation. Entrepreneurs are driven by a set of diverse motivations and 
their activity is fundamental for economic development. Innovation is the steady new fresh 
blood through new ideas and people who keep the capitalist machine going. However, 
creativity is always combined with destruction elsewhere. When new products appear, 
consumer demands change, and existing production and related markets are rendered 
obsolete. In some cases, entire communities are negatively impacted when the production 
of new products locates elsewhere (Bögenhold 2010, 2013). 
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3. Creative Destruction and the Future of Capitalism 
Capitalism exists always as a development with a fragile balance of coming and going 
of firms, entrepreneurs, goods, ideas, mentalities, and ideologies. Although Schumpeter is 
often regarded as academic hero of entrepreneurship and innovation, he was highly 
sceptical about the endogen creativity of capitalism to achieve a balance between creativity 
and destruction. In one chapter he posed the question Can capitalism survive? and he did 
not hesitate to answer No, in my opinion not. He actually felt that socialism would 
eventually supplant capitalism. So far, Schumpeter can be said to have underestimated the 
potential innovation sources of capitalism.  
Despite those very general conclusions about the destiny of capitalism, other voices argue 
that processes of creative destruction will affect the system of social stratification in 
modern societies. According to Collins (2013), technological displacement of middle-class 
labour is not much more than twenty years old whereas it took almost 200 years to destroy 
the working-class labour force. Therefore, none of the previous ways to compensate job 
losses will work effectively anymore in the future. Now, the twenty-first century trajectory 
of technological development is likely to push the middle classes into redundancy. 
Within recent discussion about the future of modern capitalist societies many well-thought 
speculations rely on the interplay between continued processes of globalization, increased 
trends of so-called digitalization and other forms of technological progress and their effects 
on the system of social stratification and social mobility (Wallerstein et al. 2013). Middle 
classes serve as a kind of conflict buffer of modern societies. In his discussion why there is 
no socialism in the United Stated which was questioned in book format by Werner Sombart 
in 1906 (see Sombart 1976), the upcoming middle classes and their related relative wealth 
played a central role. Sombart argued that if people earn means to engage in different 
consumption activities they start to arrange positively with a political-economic system 
receiving a status, which is worth defending. With roast beef and apple pie all socialist 
dreams disappear, was somehow the answer by Sombart (1976) to the stability of capitalism 
in early 20th century. 
This paper is about a socioeconomics and sociology of middle classes in a theoretical 
discussion and empirically focussing at the segment of middle classes. The argumentation 
gets started by discussion about creative destruction and its appearance in context to 
digitalization and the evolution of stratified societies in Europe. Collins thesis of an 
increased de-middledization shall be taken up as a hypothesis which must be confronted 
with empirical evidence in order to arrive at some better informed insights into growing 
inequality theoretically, empirically and internationally and its impact digitalization. Of 
course, the research is also rooted by recent social stratification research that has turned 
towards questions of inequality as research proxy. The current enormous success story of 
Pikettys Capital in the 21st Century (Piketty, 2014) by members of the economics and 
sociology communities is a demonstration of the ongoing attraction of questions about 
(in)equality and stratification (Boushey et al. 2017, King 2017). 
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4. Creative Destruction and Jobs 
Academic observers have almost focused at the assumed negative consequences of economic 
development and described them as warnings. Fear of deserted factory halls go back already 
to the 1960th when an article in Time Magazine argued already this way:  
The number of jobs lost to more efficient machines is only part of the problem. What worries 
many job experts more is that automation may prevent the economy from creating enough 
new jobs. . . . Throughout industry, the trend has been to bigger production with a smaller 
work force. . . . Many of the losses in factory jobs have been countered by an increase in the 
service industries or in office jobs. But automation is beginning to move in and eliminate 
office jobs too. ... In the past, new industries hired far more people than those they put out 
of business. But this is not true of many of today's new industries. . . . Today's new industries 
have comparatively few jobs for the unskilled or semiskilled, just the class of workers whose 
jobs are being eliminated by automation (Time Magazine, 1991). 
Recent developments in context with robots and artificial intelligences have multiplied 
those earlier worries. The book The Second Machine Age (Brynjolfsson & McAfee 2014, p. 
11): 
Rapid and accelerating digitization is likely to bring economic rather than environmental 
disruption, stemming from the fact that as computers get more powerful, companies have 
less need for some kinds of workers. Technological progress is going to leave behind some 
people, perhaps even a lot of people, as it races ahead. As we'll demonstrate, there's never 
been a better time to be a worker with special skills or the right education, because these 
people can use technology to create and capture value. However, there's never been a worse 
time to be a worker with only 'ordinary' skills and abilities to offer, because computers, 
robots, and other digital technologies are acquiring these skills and abilities at an 
extraordinary rat. 
Those fears neglect that sides of destruction are always in parallel with areas of creativity 
at the same time which lead to the evolution of new tasks and job profiles in different other 
areas. While Randall Collins (2013) is almost pessimistic in his perceived evaluation in 
context with the process of increased digitalization, which lead to a stretching of 
inequality, David Autor (2011, 2014, and 2015) regards positive potentials. It is a tricky 
research endeavour to investigate the interplay of Artificial Intelligence, Automation and 
Work (Acemoglu and Restrepo 2018). Research needs concrete empirical data to get 
instruction which position is more adequate than another. We know also that digitalization 
goes along with sustainable changes of occupations and their contents where new 
competencies will be fostered (Yoo et al, 2012), especially with mathematical skills and 
thought in cross disciplinary thought, creativity and languages (Deming 2015). Research for 
positive and negative impacts of the digitalization process on inequality and the persistence 
of the middle classes is an eminent important task. Our research is about the question of 
stretching. Will stratified societies turn its middle tentatively from convex to concave 
curves? 
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5. Empirical analysis 
5.1 The Model and Dataset 
We conduct an empirical analysis to test the hypothesis that digitalization leads to the 
shrinking size of the middle class with EU countries as the unit of analysis. The dataset 
covers the unbalance panel data for the period 2003-2014 (12 years) consisting of 31 group 
of observations. The 28 of them are the members of EU and the rest are Switzerland, 
Iceland, and Norway. The data are obtained from Eurostat database. 
A series of panel regressions are presented to investigate the relationship between a variety 
of digitalization measurements and the size of the middle class in European countries. The 
basic model is as follows _	
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where Middle_class represents dependent variable, a series measures of the size of the 
middle class in a country while digitalization stands for one group of digitalization measures 
as independent variables. The rest are control variables: EduHigh and EduLow are the 
proportion of high educated and low educated labor respectively, GovExp stands for 
government expenditure as percentage to GDP and Openness is trade openness index as 
measure for globalization. GDP per capita, population growth, and the rate of 
unemployment are also included in the model. Meanwhile, µ is constant,  is coefficient 
for each variable, and v and  are unobserved country/region specific characteristics which 
are time-invariant effects and idiosyncratic error terms, respectively. The model shows the 
presence of subscript time lag h in the independent variables. The use of lagged 
independent variable is a common strategy to confront simultaneously problem. It also 
clarifies that the independent variable needs a delay in giving an impact to the explained 
phenomenon.  
The nature of a static panel data requires us to choose between fixed effects or random 
effects model. The Hausman test can be used to test the correlation between idiosyncratic 
errors and the independent variables. If the correlation is there, the fixed effect model is 
the appropriate method of estimation. In our case the null hypothesis of Hausman test is 
rejected. It suggests that fixed effects model fits better rather than random effects model. 
Theoretically, fixed effect model is relevant in this case because it controls the unobserved 
time-invariant country heterogeneity and thus it is in line with the assumption of path-
dependence in evolutionary economic field. 
5.2 Dependent Variables 
Surprisingly, there is no single definition about middle class among scholars (Pressman, 
2015). For a long period of time, distributional studies have focused on the poor and the 
rich while those in the middle are forgotten (Atkinson and Brandolini, 2011). The concern 
to define and measure the middle class has been increasing in the past decade since the 
issue of shrinking middle class became a major anxiety. Therefore, since there is no 
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consensus, any attempts to define the size of the middle class are quite obviously arbitrary 
and open to challenge (Piketty, 2014). 
In this study, we focus on the disposable household income range which is measured by the 
survey of European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) provided in 
Eurostat database. We use two approaches in defining the size of the middle class as our 
dependent variable. Firstly, our measure of the middle class starts from the median 
household income. The middle classes are defined as those whose income lies between an 
absolute lower cut-off and upper cut-off near the median. PEW Research Center (2012) 
firstly defines middle-class in US to be between 67 percent and 200 percent of the median 
income.  
However, we think there is no exact number of both lower and upper cut-off point because 
it depends on the context of the study. We follow the argument from Ravallion (2010) and 
Atkinson and Brandolini (2011) which state that the lower cut-off of the middle class is 
equivalent with the line threshold of at-risk-of poverty. In other words, those who are 
classified as middle class are those who do not have any risk of poverty. In the EU, at-risk-
of poverty threshold is set at 60 percent of the national median household income. Thus, 
we choose that number to set the lower cut-off for defining the middle class. Meanwhile, 
the upper cut-off distinguishes the middle class and the rich. We set the 150 percent of the 
median as the upper cut-off for defining the middle class as also suggested by Grabka and 
Frick (2008) to measure the size of German middle class. To sum up, this study defines the 
middle class as the population group with a relative income position between 60 and 150 
percent of the median. 
Secondly, we look at the fraction of income received by the middle 60 percent of earners 
which was firstly defined as middle class by a Nobel Laurate economist, Robert Solow 
(Atkinson and Brandolini, 2011). It is regarded as the middle three income quintiles between 
the top quintile of 20 percent of the richest and the bottom quintile of 20 percent of the 
poorest. As the robustness check, we also consider a less size of middle class by limiting the 
size to the middle 40 percent of earners. For each country, Eurostat provides household 
income per decile of distribution. Thus, we can calculate the income share of both the 
middle 40 percent and 60 percent of earners. While the first approach focuses on the share 
of the population, this second approach emphasizes the share of income in the population. 
Table 1 and Table 2 capture the size of the middle class in EU countries measured by the 
first and second approaches respectively. The correlation between the first and second 
approach of middle class measurement is 0.76. The de-middledization phenomenon in the 
current decade can be shown obviously, when the middle class is defined by the first 
approach: middle classes are those between 60 percent and 150 percent of median 
household income. As can be seen in Table 1, 20 out of 31 EU countries experience the 
declining of the middle class in the period of 2003-2014. The highest de-middledization 
phenomenon are experienced by Germany (-9.3 percent decline), Sweden (-6.4 percent), 
and Spain (-6 percent) respectively. Interestingly, despite of the shringking phenomenon, in 
all of Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands, the size of the middle class are greater 
than 70 percent of the population. It suggests that those countries tend to be more equal 
with regards to the distribution of income. 
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Table 1: Population share of the bottom, middle, and top income groups in EU countries 
2003-2014 
Country 
First observation (2003-2007) Last observation (2014) 
Size of 
Middle 
Class 
Poor 
Middle 
Class Rich Poor 
Middle 
Class Rich 
below 
60% 60%-150% 
Above 
150% 
below 
60% 60%-150% 
Above 
150% 
Belgium 15.4 67.5 18.2 15.5 68 17.1 Increase 
Bulgaria 18.4 56.6 21.4 21.8 55 23 Decrease 
Czech 
Republic 10.4 72.3 17.8 9.7 74.2 16.1 Increase 
Denmark 11.7 76.7 12.4 12.1 72 15.8 Decrease 
Germany 12.2 71.7 15.8 16.7 62.4 20.9 Decrease 
Estonia 20.2 55.1 26.6 21.8 51.2 27.2 Decrease 
Ireland 20.5 58.9 20.2 16.4 60.9 22.8 Increase 
Greece 20.7 56.2 23.9 22.1 55.9 22.7 Decrease 
Spain 20.1 58.7 21.2 22.2 52.7 25.2 Decrease 
France 13.5 67.8 19.2 13.3 68.7 17.7 Increase 
Croatia 20.6 56.4 25 19.4 58.5 21.5 Increase 
Italy 18.9 59.3 21.5 19.4 59.1 21 Decrease 
Cyprus 16.1 63.5 20.9 14.4 60.2 23.6 Decrease 
Latvia 19.4 51.1 25.4 21.2 51.7 25.8 Increase 
Lithuania 20.5 53.6 26.4 19.1 52 25.8 Decrease 
Luxembourg 11.9 68.2 19.1 16.4 64.2 20.5 Decrease 
Hungary 13.5 67.2 16.9 15 66.6 18.5 Decrease 
Malta 14.3 65.1 20.7 15.9 65.2 18.5 Increase 
Netherlands 10.7 73.8 16.5 11.6 71.9 16.5 Decrease 
Austria 13.2 69.1 17.9 14.1 68.6 17.5 Decrease 
Poland 20.5 57.1 23.8 17 61.1 21.3 Increase 
Portugal 20.4 55.3 25.3 19.5 56.5 24 Increase 
Romania 24.6 51.4 25 25.1 49.6 25 Decrease 
Slovenia 12.2 73.4 15 14.5 69.9 15.8 Decrease 
Slovakia 13.3 72.2 16.2 12.6 71.8 15.9 Decrease 
Finland 11 73.1 15.2 12.8 71.3 16.3 Decrease 
Sweden 11.3 76.8 13.7 15.1 70.4 15.1 Decrease 
United 
Kingdom 19 57.6 23.4 16.8 60.2 23.2 Increase 
Iceland 10 76.5 13.8 7.9 76.5 13.9 Decrease 
Norway 10.8 77 12.2 10.9 75.1 13 Decrease 
Switzerland 15 64.3 20 13.8 64.9 19.5 Increase 
Source: Authors calculations from Eurostat database 
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Table 2: Income share of the bottom, middle, and top income groups in EU countries 2003-
2014 
Country 
First observation (2003-2007) Last observation (2013-2014) 
Size of 
Middle 
Class 
Poor 
Middle 
Class Rich Poor 
Middle 
Class Rich 
bottom 
20% 60% top 20% 
bottom 
20% 60% 
top 
20% 
Belgium 8.5 54.9 36.6 9.2 56.0 34.8 Increase 
Bulgaria 7.5 53.7 38.8 6.2 51.8 42.0 Decrease 
Czech Rep. 9.8 54.2 36.0 10.1 54.2 35.7 Decrease 
Denmark 9.7 55.9 34.4 8.9 54.5 36.6 Decrease 
Germany 9.5 54.6 35.9 7.4 54.3 38.3 Decrease 
Estonia 6.1 49.9 44.0 6.4 51.5 42.1 Increase 
Ireland 7.8 53.9 38.3 8.1 52.7 39.2 Decrease 
Greece 6.5 52.1 41.4 6.5 52.5 41.0 Increase 
Spain 7.3 54.3 38.4 5.9 53.4 40.7 Decrease 
France 9.0 53.5 37.5 9.1 52.4 38.5 Decrease 
Croatia 7.0 54.3 38.7 7.3 55.2 37.5 Increase 
Italy 7.2 52.6 40.2 6.8 53.9 39.3 Increase 
Cyprus 8.6 53.9 37.5 8.0 48.9 43.1 Decrease 
Latvia 6.4 50.7 42.9 6.5 51.2 42.3 Increase 
Lithuania 6.2 50.7 43.1 6.9 51.0 42.1 Increase 
Luxembourg 9.2 53.6 37.2 8.3 54.7 37.0 Increase 
Hungary 9.2 53.8 37.0 8.8 53.7 37.5 Decrease 
Malta 9.2 54.9 35.9 9.1 54.1 36.8 Decrease 
Netherlands 9.1 54.9 36.0 9.3 55.1 35.6 Increase 
Austria 9.0 54.3 36.7 9.0 54.3 36.7 Decrease 
Poland 6.4 51.3 42.3 7.9 53.2 38.9 Increase 
Portugal 6.3 48.6 45.1 6.7 51.6 41.7 Increase 
Romania 5.4 50.5 44.1 5.8 53.8 40.4 Increase 
Slovenia 9.9 56.3 33.8 9.2 56.3 34.5 Decrease 
Slovakia 9.0 55.5 35.5 9.1 55.4 35.5 Decrease 
Finland 10.0 54.5 35.5 9.7 55.0 35.3 Increase 
Sweden 9.8 57.3 32.9 8.8 56.8 34.4 Decrease 
United Kingdom 7.1 50.9 42.0 7.7 53.0 39.3 Increase 
Iceland 10.1 55.5 34.4 10.6 55.8 33.6 Increase 
Norway 9.7 53.7 36.6 9.9 56.5 33.6 Increase 
Switzerland 8.2 52.9 38.9 8.6 52.9 38.5 Decrease 
Source: Authors calculations from Eurostat database 
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5.3 Independent Variables 
The term of digital economy which was introduced by Tapscotts book in 1996 refers to an 
economic system where the use of ICT is widely spread (Kotarba, 2017). Since then, 
measuring the digital economy is popular among scholars and even policy regulators. OECD 
(2014), for instance, has identified a comprehensive set of indicators for comparisons 
between countries in term of their digital economies. Mueller et al (2017) found at least 11 
cross-country studies between 2013 and 2015 which attempt to measure the digital 
economy. Some of those indicators are R&D spending in ICT, labor productivity in ICT related 
sector, value added of ICT related sector, ICT investment and infrastructure, ICT related 
sector revenue and its share to GDP, and number of patents in ICT related sector as the 
measurement of innovation in digital economy. Some of them even propose the ICT 
composite index which combines the numerous ICT variables (for instance OECD, 2014; Katz 
and Koutroumpis, 2013; and International Telecommunication Union, 2014). 
In this study we limit the digitalization indicators into three main measurements which are: 
innovation output, economic, and employment indicators. Hypothetically, those three 
indicators have the potential possibility to link with income distribution and the size of the 
middle class. The first indicator is ICT-related patent as the proxy of innovation in ICT 
sectors. This study uses European Patent Office (EPO) patent applications per million of 
total population as provided by Eurostat. Despite of its drawback, patent is regarded as an 
outcome of a successful innovation process. For the use of cross country comparison, patent 
statistics are unique since they provide the long historical time series (Cantwell & Vertova, 
2004) and roughly comparable between the unit of analysis. ICT-related patents consist of 
five fields based on selected IPC codes including telecommunications, consumer electronics, 
computers, office machinery, and other ICT-related technologies. 
The second indicator to measure digitalization is the share of ICT sector in GDP. To deal 
with the size of GDP, we multiply the percentage of ICT sector in GDP with GDP per capita. 
Thus, the product represents the size of revenue in ICT sectors per total population of the 
country. The definition of the ICT sector is based on NACE Rev. 2 classification which consists 
of ICT manufacturing and ICT services. Lastly, we use the ICT employment as share of total 
employment as the third indicator of digitalization. It represents how the emerging of ICT 
sectors is able to create new job opportunities. 
5.4 Control Variables 
Several control variables are included in the model to consider the presence of other 
potential explanatory variables associated with the size of the middle class. First of all, GDP 
per capita is included as the common control for the level of economic of countries. We use 
current prices of GDP per capita adjusted by purchasing power parities in euro currencies 
as provided by the Eurostat. Additionally, population growth, representing the density of a 
region, is also included in the model. Many studies link population growth with the 
distribution of income in two directions (for instance Winegarden, 1978). 
We then incorporate government spending in controlling the model as the measure of 
government power to maintain the size of the middle class through the redistributive 
spending. Thus, we expect the positive correlation between them. The next control variable 
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is trade openness which is defined as the ratio of total trade (i.e. export plus import) to 
GDP. Trade openness ratio may be seen as an indicator of the degree of globalisation. Both 
variables are gathered from PENN World Table. 
Educational attainment levels are also included to reflect the distribution of human capital 
among the working population. Given by Eurostat, high educated people are defined as 
those adult population who reach tertiary education level (levels 5 to 8) whereas low 
educated people are those adult population whose education level is less than secondary 
level of education (levels 0 to 2). Finally, we include unemployment rate as the control 
variable considering the link between the degrees of unemployment with the shrinking size 
of the middle class. Due to the unemployment, a worker in a middle class group could move 
down to the lower level of economic status. To sum up, all of the variables included in the 
model are demonstrated in Table 3. 
Table 3: List of variables 
Variable Names Description Source
Measure of middle class (Dependent Variables)
Middle_class Share of household having income between 60% and 
150% of Median 
Eurostat
Mid60 Share of income of household between decile 30 and 80 
compare to total income of population
Eurostat
Mid40 Share of income of household between decile 40 and 70 
compare to total income of population
Eurostat
Measure of digitalization (Independent Variables)
Patent_ICT_pop The number of patent application to the EPO per million 
population for information and communication 
technology (ICT) manufacturing and services 
Eurostat
ICT_GDP Share of ICT sector to GDP multiplied by GDP per Capita Eurostat
ICT_employee Share of people working in the Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT) sector compare to 
total employment 
Eurostat
Control Variables
GDPpcap Real GDP per capita in Euro adjusted by Purchasing 
Power Parity 
Eurostat
Popgrowth Growth of total population Eurostat
Gov_Exp Ratio of government expenditure to GDP Penn World Table
Openness Ratio of countrys total trade (export plus import) to 
GDP  
Penn World Table
Edu_high Population of working age with tertiary education 
degree 
Eurostat
Edu_low Population of working age with lower than secondary 
education degree 
Eurostat
Unemploy Unemployment rate Eurostat
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5.5 Results 
Table 4 and Table 5 give the results of fixed effect panel regressions for ICT-related 
patenting activities against the measures of the size of the middle class. In Table 4 we 
present how the various time lag for the independent variable affect the correlation with 
the size of the middle class. It is shown that ICT-related patents do not have significant 
correlation with the size of the middle class when the time lag is less than 3 years. Thus, it 
suggests that time lag for patent does matter. It is in line with the previous research from 
Ken, Tsai, and Ou (2008) which proposes that there is a time lag of 4 to 5 years for patent 
to give impact to firm profitability in U.S pharmaceutical industry. 
Table 4: ICT-related patent (innovation in digital economy) with various time lag and the 
size of the middle class 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
mid_class mid_class mid_class mid_class mid_class 
patent_ict_pop lag 1 year 0.007 
(0.011) 
patent_ict_pop lag 2 years -0.020 
(0.014) 
patent_ict_pop lag 3 years -0.027** 
(0.013) 
patent_ict_pop lag 4 years -0.024**                 
(0.012)                 
patent_ict_pop lag 5 years -0.024**  
(0.012)    
Gdpcap -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000**  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
pop_growth 0.058** 0.059** 0.058** 0.048* 0.047*   
(0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)    
edu_high -0.034 -0.029 -0.043 -0.067 -0.051    
(0.065) (0.066) (0.064) (0.063) (0.063)    
edu_low -0.032 -0.021 -0.037 -0.052 -0.045    
(0.054) (0.056) (0.054) (0.051) (0.051)    
gov_exp -14.067** -16.758** -17.342*** -13.741** -15.471**  
(6.595) (6.553) (6.528) (6.421) (6.421)    
Openness 0.335 0.241 0.369 0.246 0.310    
(0.767) (0.771) (0.740) (0.731) (0.713)    
unemploy 0.074 0.083* 0.072 0.042 0.050    
(0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045)    
Constant 70.577*** 71.576*** 72.575*** 72.937*** 72.512*** 
(3.030) (3.005) (2.978) (2.922) (2.950)    
R-square   0.0917 0.0957 0.1047 0.0990 0.0969    
Group (Countries) 31 31 31 31 31 
N (Observation) 310 310 311 311 312    
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1. 
Time span: 2003-2012 (12 years). Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Meanwhile, using panel analysis of Germany manufacturing industry, Ernst (2001) find 
patent applications affect sales increases with a time-lag of 2 to 3 years after the priority 
year. 
Since the strongest correlation is shown by 3 years of time lag, in Table 5 we present the 
results of the regressions between the 3-years-lag of independent variable and various 
measures of the size of the middle class. The results strongly indicate the relationship 
between innovations in digital sector and the size of the middle class. These relationships 
are significant and negative in all cases confirming our hypothesis that digitalization may 
lead to the shrinking of the middle class in European countries. As the robustness check, in 
column 4 we present the relationship between independent variable and income inequality 
indicators. The positive and significant correlation indicates that the shrinking size of middle 
class phenomenon is in line with the higher gap in the distribution of income.  
Table 5: ICT-related patent (3 years lag) and the size of the middle class 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
middle_class mid_60 mid_40 Gini 
patent_ict_pop lag 3 years -0.027** -0.017** -0.011** 0.019** 
(0.013) (0.007) (0.005) (0.009) 
Gdpcap -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
pop_growth 0.058** 0.050*** 0.036*** -0.050** 
(0.025) (0.014) (0.010) (0.021) 
edu_high -0.043 0.062* 0.034 -0.122** 
(0.064) (0.036) (0.026) (0.049) 
edu_low -0.037 0.064** 0.041** -0.069* 
(0.054) (0.028) (0.020) (0.040) 
gov_exp -17.342*** 0.501 0.895 0.719 
(6.528) (3.694) (2.654) (4.738) 
Openness 0.369 0.604 0.651** -0.702 
(0.740) (0.391) (0.281) (0.538) 
Unemploy 0.072 0.070*** 0.048*** 0.016 
(0.045) (0.025) (0.018) (0.034) 
Constant 72.575*** 49.585*** 32.417*** 33.630*** 
(2.978) (1.643) (1.180) (2.236) 
R-squared   0.1047 0.0955 0.0979 0.0746 
group (countries) 31 31 31 31 
N (Observation) 311 329 329 358 
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1. 
Time span: 2003-2012 (12 years). Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 Column 1: Dependent variable is the share of population of the middle class between 60% and 150% 
median 
 Column 2: Dependent variable is the share of income of middle class between 30%-80% population 
 Column 3: Dependent variable is the share of income of middle class between 40%-70% population 
 Column 4: Dependent variable is gini index as the measure of inequality (robustness check) 
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Table 6 demonstrates the results for ICT share in GDP and share of employment in ICT sector 
against the measures of the size of the middle class. Those two independent variables 
perform considerably worse than the ICT-related innovation variable. In the first and fifth 
column, it is shown that ICT share in GDP and employment in ICT sector have significant and 
negative correlation with the size of the middle class in 90 percent of confidence level 
interval. The results confirm the hypothesis that not only does innovation in digital sector 
affect the shrinking middle class, but the size of economies and employment in ICT sectors 
do also matter. The higher size of GDP proportion and the number of employment in ICT-
sectors lead to the declining size of the middle class. 
However, the results are not robust when we change the dependent variables from the 
population share (the first approach) to the income share (the second approach). The 
correlation between independent and dependent variables change into the positive 
direction as can be seen in the second, third, sixth and seventh columns. Thus, we conclude 
that the effect of ICT sector size in GDP and total employment on the size of the middle 
class is not clear in this model. 
It means that the shrinking size of the middle class is not affected directly by the size of 
ICT sector. The explanation could be because the power of digitalization is not only 
benefited by those who work in ICT sector. Since ICT is a general purpose of technology, its 
impact will occur across sectors. The role of ICT is different from prior technological 
revolutions which generally disrupt only a specific sector at a time but then are able to 
generate new emerging industries (Ford, 2015). In contrast, innovations in ICT broadly affect 
numerous occupations in all sectors of industry. Therefore, approaching digitalization 
indicator by the contribution of ICT sector to the GDP and total employment could be 
misleading. 
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Table 6: ICT size in GDP, ICT employment and the size of the middle class 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
middle_class mid_60 mid_40 Gini middle_class mid_60 mid_40 gini 
ICT_GDP -0.000* 0.000* 0.000** 0.000    
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
ICT_employee -1.141* 0.435* 0.328* -0.083    
(0.688) (0.231) (0.167) (0.442)    
Gdpcap -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
pop_growth 0.162*** 0.062** 0.048*** -0.122*** 0.123*** 0.078*** 0.058*** -0.115*** 
(0.045) (0.024) (0.017) (0.033)    (0.041) (0.021) (0.015) (0.029)    
edu_high -0.424*** -0.062 -0.047 0.117    -0.139 -0.021 -0.020 -0.039    
(0.107) (0.059) (0.043) (0.075)    (0.101) (0.052) (0.038) (0.066)    
edu_low -0.136 0.023 0.017 0.029    -0.047 0.038 0.022 -0.063    
(0.085) (0.040) (0.029) (0.057)    (0.087) (0.040) (0.029) (0.055)    
gov_exp -20.143** 7.490 5.374 -1.386    -28.193*** 6.704 4.649 0.401    
(8.755) (4.907) (3.547) (5.999)    (9.999) (4.644) (3.350) (5.976)    
Openness 1.787 1.080* 0.767* -1.370*   1.324 1.076** 0.779** -1.239*   
(1.106) (0.563) (0.407) (0.802)    (1.082) (0.531) (0.383) (0.739)    
Unemploy 0.251*** 0.103*** 0.075*** -0.089**  0.232*** 0.093*** 0.066*** -0.066    
(0.056) (0.030) (0.022) (0.040)    (0.062) (0.031) (0.022) (0.042)    
Constant 79.553*** 50.198*** 32.791*** 28.684*** 76.364*** 48.604*** 31.988*** 34.030*** 
(4.808) (2.482) (1.794) (3.159)    (4.797) (2.220) (1.602) (2.973)    
R-squared 0.2192 0.1025 0.1081 0.0889    0.1595 0.1256 0.1266 0.1065    
group (countries) 26 26 26 26 27 27 27 27 
N (Observation) 195 216 216 220    214 234 234 242
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1. Time span: 2003-2012 (12 years). Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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6. Conclusion 
Many previous studies attempt to elaborate the effect of digitalization on the distribution 
of income. Nevertheless, little is known about its impact on the shrinking size of the middle 
class in particular. Meanwhile, essentially, the rise of income inequality and the shrinking 
middle class are two sides of the same coin. The proponent of skill biased technical change 
(see for instance Acemoglu, 2002; Autor, Levy, and Murnane, 2003) argues that income 
inequality rises because middle-class workers are replaced by computerization and 
automation. As a consequence, the size of those in the middle decline along with the 
increase polarization between high skilled and low skilled workers. 
Randal Collins (2013) is the first who explicitly link the digitalization and computerization 
and the shrinking of the middle class in sociological perspective. In this study, we construct 
a hypothesis by linking Collins (2013) proposal to the evolutionary economics discourse and 
the term of creative destruction introduced by Joseph Schumpeter. Then, this study is the 
first which test the relationship empirically with EU countries as the unit of the analysis in 
the period 2003-2012. The results are summarized in Table 7. 
Table 7: Summary of results 
Variable 
Measure of Middle Class 
Measure of 
Inequality 
Share of 
Middle class 
size 
(60%-150% 
median) 
Share of 
Middle 60 
income 
(30%-80% of 
earners) 
Share of 
Middle 40 
income 
(40%-70% of 
earners) 
Gini index 
Measure of 
Digitalization 
Patent in ICT 
Sector 
(Innovations) 
Negative 
** 
Negative 
** 
Negative 
** 
Positive 
** 
ICT in GDP 
(economics) 
Negative
* 
Positive
* 
Positive
* 
Not Significant 
ICT employment 
Negative
* 
Positive
* 
Positive
* 
Not Significant 
We find the evidence of a negative link between digitalization and the size of the middle 
class, but the result is highly sensitive to the definition of middle class as the dependent 
variable. As suggested by Piketty (2014), the term of middle class is debatable because it 
does not have any single definition. The most consistent effect is shown when we define the 
middle class as the share of households whose incomes are between 60 percent and 150 
percent median. 
While there appears to be only limited effect of ICT contribution on GDP and total 
employment on the size of the middle class, the evidence is highly significant in the effect 
of innovation in digital sector as measured by ICT-related patents on the size of the middle 
class. One explanation for this might be ICT-related innovation is benefited not only by those 
in ICT sectors, but also the wide array of occupations. Therefore, approaching digitalization 
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indicator by the contribution of ICT sector to the GDP and total employment could be 
misleading. With this paper, we have provided only the first test of the relationship between 
digitalization and the size of the middle class.  
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